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Oscar Wilde once wrote that the only thing to do with good advice is to pass it 
on, as it is never any use to oneself. When I think back to my first year of 
university, and to the first few weeks in particular, there certainly was a lot of 
advice handed out. It came from all angles: programme leaders; module 
leaders; teaching staff; personal tutors; the careers service; and professional 
panels. I would be lying if I said I can remember it all, but there was one piece 
of advice that has stuck in my mind throughout the last four years: it is never 
too early to start thinking about the final year project. As a result, this project 
has been lingering in the back of my mind, in one form or another, throughout 
my entire time at university.     
 
From the very beginning I knew that the project would involve a substantial 
amount of time and work. I also know how tedious it can be writing about a 
subject that you have little interest in, and so I was determined to find an area 
that I would find genuinely fascinating to research. With this in mind, there were 
a number of themes that I could have chosen to write about, but none of them 
felt quite right. They did interest me but they did not excite me in the way that I 
had hoped for. As soon as I heard about the Legal History Project, however, I 
instantly knew that this was the route that I wanted to follow. I also knew exactly 
what I wanted to write about: nineteenth century coal mines.  
 
Unlike with some interests, I can pinpoint the exact origin of my curiosity in coal 
mines. It started when I was only nine years old and read Roy Thompson’s How 
Long did the Ponies Live? The Story of the Colliery at Killingworth and West 
Moor for the first time. I have lived in Killingworth all of my life and so, naturally, 
the book caught my attention. As I read through the book I suddenly found 
myself confronted with answers to questions that I didn’t even know I had. For 
example, I had never even thought about why there is a fifteen-acre lake in the 
middle of the town, or why certain roads were laid where they are, or even why 
buildings have the names that they have. Each time I read the book, which I 
still do frequently, I pick up on some previously overlooked detail, which leads 
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in turn to some new connection with the past. I think it’s fair to say that my 
interest in nineteenth century coal mines, and the social history that surrounds 
them, is more that a mere curiosity.  
 
When it was agreed that my project could be centred on this area the main 
issue I faced was deciding upon a suitable question. Initially my question was 
going to be: To what extent was the legislation protecting colliery workers in the 
nineteenth century satisfactory? It soon became clear that this question was far 
too wide; it would have been impossible to answer within the permitted word 
limit. During one of the first visits to the Tyne and Wear Archives I looked 
through a variety of documents, one of which was the Society for the Prevention 
of Accidents in Coal Mines collection. Within the collection there are numerous 
items regarding the dangerous state of the coal mines in the nineteenth century, 
as well as the various attempts to increase safer working practices. I thought 
that this would be an interesting area to focus on, and so looked into the ways 
in which increased safety had been proposed. One proposal was the creation 
of Government Inspectors who would visit the collieries, which were frequently 
suggested to be a ‘panacea’ for the ‘numerous evils’ associated with coal 
mining in the nineteenth century. This quote has been included in the final 
version of my question, which focuses my project on the Government 
inspectors of mines and collieries, including the legislation underpinning the 
role.     
 
It must be said that during my initial research into the Government inspectors, 
there was a surprising lack of readily available information about them. It 
became clear that the role had not been widely studied in the past, and I was 
unsure about where my research would ultimately lead. In spite of this 
uncertainty there was no apprehension or foreboding; I was genuinely 
enthusiastic about completing the project. After all, as Mary Shelley once 
penned: ‘with how many things are we upon the brink of becoming acquainted, 





A Brief History of the Coal Trade  A Summary of Colliery 
Legislation  An Introduction to Government Inspection 
 
It has long been recognised that ‘we know little regarding the ancient history’ of 
the coal trade,1 and that the earliest ‘attempts at coal mining are enveloped in 
obscurity’.2 It has been suggested that coal was ‘employed to some extent by 
the Roman’ population in Britain,3 supported by the discovery of ashes of coal 
fires ‘amongst the mortar of Roman buildings near Newcastle’.4 The use of coal 
by the Romans does, however, appear to have been quite restricted.5 Indeed, 
some authors suggest that it was not until the middle of the ninth century that 
there is ‘less doubtful ground’ to support the emergence of the coal trade in 
Britain.6 In attempting to determine the beginning of the British coal trade, it 
cannot be denied that ‘men equally endowed may arrive at conclusions the 
most diverse’, 7  and so it is sufficient to say that such trade was firmly 
established, at least in the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, by the end of the 
thirteenth century. This is the position adopted by Galloway, who relied on the 
increase in the revenue of Newcastle upon Tyne in this century, during his 
comprehensive analysis of the history of the British coal trade. When King John 
handed control of the town to the burgesses in 1213 the annual rent was £100, 




1 Robert Lindsay Galloway, A History of Coal Mining in Great Britain (Macmillan and Co 1882) 
2 
2 Edward Hull, The Coal Fields of Great Britain: Their History, Structure and Resources with 
Notices of the Coal Fields of Other Parts of the World (2nd edn, Edward Stanford 1861) 7  
3 Thomas Crosbee Cantrill, Coal Mining (Cambridge University Press 1914) 3 
4 Robert John Charleton, A History of Newcastle on Tyne: From the Earliest Records to its 
Formation as a City (Davis Books 1989) 252 
5 See, for example, Cantrill (n3) 3 
6 John Holland, The History and Description of Fossil Fuel, the Collieries, and Coal Trade of 
Great Britain (Whittaker and Co 1835) 309  
7 Gilbert Stone, The British Coal Industry (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd 1919) 1 
8 Robert Lindsay Galloway, Annals of Coal Mining and the Coal Trade, vol 1 (David & Charles 
1971) 24 
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At the commencement of the eighteenth century Britain was producing in the 
region of two-point-six million tons of coal a year,9 although John Hatcher has 
suggested that this figure should, in fact, be closer to three million tons a year.10 
Even with the more reserved estimate, Britain’s coal industry represented ‘five 
times the rest of world output’,11 establishing ‘firm foundations which were to 
underpin the fuelling of the industrial revolution’. 12  Over the course of the 
eighteenth century production increased further still, until output was estimated 
to be ten million tons per year by 1800 and fifteen million tons per year by 
1816.13 This ensured that coal was undoubtedly ‘the commanding height of the 
British economy’ during the nineteenth century.14  
 
It is remarkable to note that in the five hundred years that elapsed between the 
close of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
there was very little legislation relating to the industry. The legislation that was 
implemented ‘did nothing to improve the health and safety of miners’;15 instead, 
it portrayed the mining population as being of a ‘lawless and dangerous 
character’,16 arguably leading to miners being regarded as ‘a class apart’ from 
civilised society.17 For example, the Act for the Security of Collieries and Mines, 
and for the Better Regulation of Colliers and Miners 180018 suggested that 
collieries were ‘greatly exposed to the depredations of wicked and evil-disposed 
persons’ employed by them,19 and introduced a number of criminal offences 
aimed at protecting the interests of the colliery owners. An example of such an 
offence, which it was claimed ‘often happens’, 20  was ‘colliers and miners, 
disregarding their agreements, wilfully and obstinately [working] coal … in a 
 
9 Jonathan Clark, From Restoration to Reform: The British Isles 1660-1832 (Vintage 2014) 59 
10 John Hatcher, The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume 1: Before 1700: Towards the 
Age of Coal (Oxford University Press 1993) 5 
11 Clark (n9) 59 
12 Hatcher (n10) 5 
13 Robert Nelson Boyd, Coal Mines Inspection: Its History and Results (W H Allen & Co 1879) 
25 
14 P. W. J. Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832-1875: Some Observations’ (1982) 25 
The Historical Journal 605, 611 
15 Ernest Mason, Practical Coal Mining, vol 2 (3rd edn, Virtue 1953) 687  
16 Boyd (n13) 20 
17 Mason (n15) 687 
18 Act for the Security of Collieries and Mines, and for the Better Regulation of Colliers and 
Miners 1800 (40 Geo 3 c 77) 
19 ibid, s 1 
20 ibid, s 3 
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different manner’ to that stipulated by the colliery owners.21 Such an offence 
was punishable by way of a fine not exceeding forty shillings or, if unpaid, a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding six months. It has been documented that 
hewers, the men who worked the coalface, were paid an average of three 
shillings per day at one colliery in 1814.22 This figure should, however, be 
approached with caution; while it has been recognised that hewers were often 
paid more than other colliery workers, it should be noted that they were 
frequently fined for sending ‘light’ tubs to the surface, even when this was the 
result of coal being lost after the tub had left their control.23 Such fines are not 
always considered in the literature on collier wages, with the result that it is 
difficult to make generalisations about colliery pay in the nineteenth century. 
 
Kirby has emphasised the importance of the contemporary setting when 
engaging in historical analysis. To consider the nineteenth century coal mining 
industry without reflecting on prevailing views of the time, for example, would 
be both futile and reprehensible.24 Likewise, it should be remembered that coal 
mining was not the only growing industry in nineteenth century Britain. While 
the coal industry was largely unregulated, the Factory Act 1833 gave extensive 
protection to the factory workers and conferred wide powers on the inspectors 
who were appointed under it.25 These factory inspectors were given extensive 
authority to make inquiries, to enforce the provisions of the Act, and to make 
binding rules and orders. As a result of this, Martin considered the Factory Act 
1833 to be an innovative and highly effective piece of legislation.26 In light of 
this success it may be expected that a similar piece of legislation would have 




22 Roy Thompson, How Long Did the Ponies Live? The Story of the Colliery at Killingworth 
and West Moor (Beacon House 1997) 31 
23 See, for example, Guy Samuel Solomon, ‘The Living Standards of Tyneside Coal Miners, 
1836-1862’ (MSc by Research, University of York 2014) 
24 M W Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry 1870-1946: A Political and Economic History 
(The Macmillan Press Ltd 1977) 3 
25 Factory Act 1833 (3 Wil 4 c 103)   
26 Bernice Martin, ‘Leonard Horner: A Portrait of an Inspector of Factories’ (1969) 14 3 
International Review of Social History 412 
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Campbell and Turner have suggested that the paucity of legislation, legal 
protection and regulation relating to coal mining during this period should not 
be regarded as surprising, especially when considering the increasing 
dominance of the doctrine of laissez-faire in the late eighteenth century. 2728 
Avoiding legitimate responsibilities is one of the central principles of the laissez-
faire doctrine, and so it has been summarised by Bass and Avolio as the 
avoidance or absence of leadership in a particular area.29 As a result of this 
doctrine, there was increased insensitivity and intolerance towards the needs 
of the working classes from the upper and middle classes in society.30 State 
intervention was very much ‘the exception rather than the rule’31 and so the 
statutes of England remained ‘a blank as far as the interests of mines and 
miners are concerned’ between 1800 and 1842.32 Whilst ‘laissez-faire cannot 
be disregarded as a powerful and ubiquitous force both in delaying legislation 
and in determining the content of that legislation’, it must be recognised that it 
was not the only factor keeping the issue of collieries from the statute books.33 
Smith has suggested that before any legislation is implemented there should 
be careful search and investigation into the matter, thus allowing legislators to 
form a suitable conclusion as to the immediate and ultimate steps that should 
be taken.34 Indeed, the four-stage model for legislative reform, as propounded 
by MacDonagh, begins with ‘a sudden and sensational exposé of a social 
 
27 Gareth Campbell and John D Turner, ‘Substitutes for Legal Protection: Corporate 
Governance and Dividends in Victorian Britain’ (2011) 64 Economic History Review 571, 574 
28 On the doctrine of laissez-faire in the coal trade see, for example, O P Edmonds and E L 
Edmonds, ‘An Account of the Founding of HM Inspectorate of Mines and the Work of the First 
Inspector Hugh Seymour Tremenheere’ (1963) 20 British Journal of Industrial Medicine 210, 
211 
29 See, for example, Sut I Wong and Steffen Robert Giessner, ‘The Thin Line Between 
Empowering and Laissez-Faire Leadership: An Expectancy-Match Perspective’ (2018) 44 
Journal of Management 757 and Bernard M Bass and Bruce J Avolio (eds), Improving 
Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational Leadership (Sage Publications 1994) 
30 See, for example, Kim Lawes, Paternalism and Politics: The Revival of Paternalism in Early 
Nineteenth-Century Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2000) 33 
31 Philip Harling, The Powers of the Victorian State’ in Peter Mandler (ed), Liberty and 
Authority in Victorian Britain (Oxford University Press 2006) 26 
32 Boyd (n13) 2 
33 David L Cowen, ‘Liberty, Laissez-Faire and Licensure in Nineteenth Century Britain’ (1969) 
43 Bulletin of the History of Medicine 30, 34 
34 Bruce Smith, Liberty and Liberalism: A Protest Against the Growing Tendency Toward 
Undue Interference by the State, with Individual Liberty, Private Enterprise, and the Rights of 
Property  (Cosimo 2006) 196 
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evil’. 35 Such search and investigation was, however, a problematic task in 
relation to collieries, due to the ‘system of stifling all inquiry’36 that was ‘always 
pursued by colliery owners’, making it difficult for the required evil to be 
uncovered.37 Their resistance perpetuated the established view that the coal 
trade was ‘enveloped in obscurity’ and ensured that it remained firmly out of the 
public focus.38  
 
Some viewed the opposition to inquiry and legislation, spearheaded by the 
colliery owners, as ‘merely an assertion of proprietorial rights’.39 This view was 
not, however, shared by everyone; ‘public-spirited humanitarian citizens’ began 
to recognise the dangers associated with collieries, and began to advocate 
legislative measures as a way of ensuring the safety of those who were 
employed by them.40 For example, the Sunderland Society, formed in 1813 
following a fatal explosion at Felling Colliery, criticised the lack of inquests 
following deaths at collieries. One judge echoed this criticism in court in 1814, 
condemning the ‘actual breach of the law in not holding inquests on the colliers 
who perished by the frequent accidents’.41 As a result, ‘public opinion was 
aroused’42 and ‘an evil was exposed’ as being in need of a remedy.43 With 
increasing frequency, the concept of a Government inspector was proposed as 
this solution. There was, however, no clear consensus on what exactly such an 
inspector’s role should be; while George Stephenson was in favour of 
inspectors having the ‘powers to halt the working of a colliery if necessary’,44 
John Buddle ‘favoured casual inspection by mining engineers acting in an 
advisory capacity only’.45 The idea of a mines inspector, it has been suggested, 
 
35 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution: 1770-1823 (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 1999) 361 
36 Boyd (n13) 26 
37 ibid 
38 Edward Hull, The Coal Fields of Great Britain: Their History, Structure and Resources with 
Notices of the Coal Fields of Other Parts of the World (2nd edn, Edward Stanford 1861) 7 
39 Alan J Heesom, ‘The Northern Coal-Owners and the Opposition to the Coal Mines Act of 
1842’ (1980) 25 International Review of Social History 236, 236 
40 Edmonds and Edmonds (n28) 211 
41 Boyd (n13) 241 
42 Alan J Heesom, ‘The Coal Mines Act of 1842, Social Reform, and Social Control’ (1981) 24 
The Historical Journal 69, 69 
43 ibid 
44 Edmonds and Edmonds (n28) 211 
45 ibid 
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came to be regarded as ‘the panacea of the numerous evils which attended 
colliery operations’ during the nineteenth century.46 It may consequently be 
asked to what extent the mines inspectors actually proved to be a panacea for 
these evils after the role was created in 1842, with a particular focus on the 
period between 1842 and 1862.47  
 
This project will examine the public interest in mines and collieries, which 
increased significantly in the early nineteenth century, with a focus on the 
concept and role of a Government inspector. The legislation appointing 
Government inspectors of mines and collieries will be explored, together with a 
critical analysis of the work of the first government inspector, Hugh Seymour 
Tremenheere. There will be an evaluation of subsequent legislation, with 
particular emphasis on Inspector Matthias Dunn, Inspector for the Northern 
District of England, and his contributions to the industry. By focusing on 
Inspector Matthias Dunn, this project will consider the extent to which the mines 
and collieries inspectors were a panacea for the ‘evils’ associated with coal 
mining in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century. The position in the 
North East of England will then be considered in a national context with 
reference to other coal mining districts and inspectors in the United Kingdom
 
46 Matthias Dunn, ‘How to Prevent Accidents in Collieries: A Practical Treatise Upon the Best 
Means of Preventing Accidents in Coal Mines, Also, Advice Regarding Proceedings After 
Explosion’ (A and J M Carr 1862) 40 
47 Mines and Collieries Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict c 99) s (3) 
Chapter One 
Colliery Accidents  Various Reports and Committees 
 Early Legislation  The First Government Inspector 
 
MacDonagh’s four-stage model for legislative reform, identified in the 
introduction, required a sudden and catastrophic exposure of a social evil, 
which, if not acted upon, would have been intolerable to society. The concept 
of intolerability was central to MacDonagh’s model; as nineteenth century 
‘governments grew ever more responsive to public sentiment, and public 
sentiment ever more humane’, it became necessary to ensure that such 
intolerable ‘evils’ were legislated out of existence. 48 An ‘evil’ is most often 
deemed as ‘something that is very bad and harmful’,49 and, in this project, 
includes the ‘multitude of the most terrifying calamities’ that nineteenth century 
colliers faced.50 Engels included in this category: the frequent underground 
explosions; the poor ventilation of mines; and the inadequate conditions the 
colliers worked in.51  
 
On 25 May 1812 two subterranean explosions occurred at Felling Colliery, 
located in what is now Gateshead but was then part of County Durham, with 
one explosion in the John Pit and the other in the William Pit. There was a total 
of one hundred and twenty two men and boys in the mine at the time of the 
explosions; only thirty of these survived the accident, bringing the total number 
of deaths to ninety-two. While the exact cause of the explosions remained 
unknown, Hodgson’s account of the accident and rescue made it clear that 
inadequate ventilation of the mine was a serious issue. The ventilation was so 
poor that it was not possible to recover the final body until 19 September, nearly 
four months after the explosions had occurred.52 This incident at Felling Colliery 
 
48 Oliver MacDonagh, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal’ 
(1958) 1 1 The Historical Journal 52, 58  
49 ‘Meaning of Evil in English’ (Cambridge Dictionary) 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/evil> accessed 12 February 2020  
50 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Penguin Classics 2009) 
253 
51 ibid  
52 Reverend John Hodgson, Felling Colliery 1812: An Account of the Accident (Picks 
Publishing 1999)  
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is an example of one of the ‘evils’ alluded to by Engels, and represents one of 
the sudden and catastrophic events needed bring the issue of colliery safety to 
the attention of the general public.   
 
Hodgson’s account of the Felling Colliery disaster is generally regarded as the 
catalyst for the formation of the Society for Preventing Accidents in Coal 
Mines.53 This society, more commonly referred to as the Sunderland Society, 
was formally instituted on 1 October 1813, and sought to inquire into the causes 
of colliery explosions with a view of preventing them from reoccurring. The 
society’s first report, published in 1814, acknowledged their extensive 
communications with those connected to the coal trade, but regretted to report 
that they were not in possession of sufficient information to make any 
substantial recommendations at that time.54 Included in the report was a letter 
to the society from John Buddle, described as ‘a gentleman of great celebrity 
and intelligence as a viewer of coal-mines’, in which he set out the most 
common causes of colliery accidents that he had encountered in his career.55 
Confirming Hodgson’s observations of the Felling Colliery disaster, Buddle 
stated that the thorough ventilation of a mine was the ‘only method… for the 
prevention of accidents by fire’ resulting in explosions,56 but that the success of 
this depended upon ‘a judicious application’ by those responsible for the 
management of the colliery.57 Buddle also warned of the dangers associated 
with the subterranean discovery of unknown abandoned colliery workings, and 
opined that in the Northern District of England it was accidents other than 
explosions that occasioned the most casualties.58 The report clearly highlighted 
that these so called ‘evils’ were present in the coal mining industry, and called 
for further inquiry into possible remedies.59  
 
 
53 See, for example, Cantrill (n3) 31 
54 The Society for Preventing Accidents in Coal Mines, ‘The First Report of a Society for 
Preventing Accidents in Coal Mines’ (Edward Walker, 1814)  
55 ibid, 4 
56 ibid, 5 
57 ibid, 8  
58 ibid, 10; 23 
59 ibid, 3 
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Stone has observed that prior to the Sunderland Society’s report the 
‘Government had no means of judging how matters [relating to coal mining] 
stood’. 60  Given the want of inquiry into the industry this is a credible 
observation, and so in this context the lack of legislation appears, to a certain 
extent, understandable. In response to the publication of the Sunderland 
Society’s report, however, it may be expected that the Government would have 
initiated some investigatory or legislative action. In spite of the issues identified 
by the Sunderland Society and John Buddle, it was not until 1835, some twenty-
one years after the report was published, that a Select Committee was 
appointed by the House of Commons to investigate the issue in greater detail.  
 
In June 1835 the House of Commons appointed a Select Committee on 
Accidents in Mines, which published its report in September 1835. The 
committee was primarily focused on ‘ascertaining and suggesting the means 
for preventing the recurrence’ of fatal accidents, which had started to attract the 
attention of the public.61 For example, on 3 May 1815 underground mining at 
Heaton Main Colliery disturbed the abandoned workings of neighbouring 
Heaton Banks Colliery, which had become flooded with water. This water broke 
through into the tunnels of Heaton Main Colliery, trapping seventy-five men and 
boys, none of whom could be saved. 62  Such a disaster was clearly 
foreshadowed in the Sunderland Society’s report published in the previous 
year; John Buddle had explicitly warned of the dangers associated with 
abandoned workings, an obvious reference to the lack of accurate records 
available. While the 1835 Select Committee regretted with ‘apprehension that 
they [had] in great measure failed in devising adequate remedies’, they were 
able to outline some steps that should have been taken.63 In particular they 
advocated: a fit and proper person attending inquests; a better system of 
ventilating mines; the use of safety lamps underground; and the creation of 
detailed maps and plans of each colliery’s workings.  
 
60 Stone (n7) 34 
61 Home Department, Report from the Select Committee on Accidents in Mines; Together with 
the Minutes of Evidence, and Index (C (1st series) 603, 1835) 2 
62 For a more detailed account of the accident see, for example, Roy Thompson, Thunder 
Underground: Northumberland Mine Disasters 1815-1865 (Landmark Publishing 2004) 64 
63 Select Committee Report (n61) 8  
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During the course of the 1835 Select Committee’s investigations, the concept 
of an official inspector of mines and collieries was mooted for the first time. 
When asked whether an official inspector of mines and collieries should be 
appointed, George Stephenson stated that such an appointment would be 
beneficial. He suggested that there must have been ‘some neglect’ by colliery 
managers at the time,64 contributing to the frequent accidents, and that the 
appointment of an official would ‘cause managers to be always on the alert’.65 
A closer analysis of the report, however, reveals that the appointment of an 
inspector was not widely welcomed. With Joseph Pease in the chair, Charles 
Walker, one of the proprietors of Bradford Colliery, was asked whether he was 
‘one of the gentlemen… who [had]… expressed an apprehension of 
interference on the part of Government’ in relation to the coal industry.66 He 
suggested that such interference would have been ‘unnecessary’. 67  When 
presenting their report the Committee accepted that there were ‘advantages 
which might [have resulted] from’ the appointment of an inspector,68 but that 
there were ‘many serious objections… stated to the proposition’.69 As a result, 
the Committee were reluctant to present the concept of an inspector as a 
remedy for the various evils that attended colliery operations at the time. The 
apparent opposition by Charles Walker and others supports the previously 
highlighted argument, initially advanced by Boyd, that the colliery owners 
systematically stifled all inquiry into the trade.70 The notion of inspection was 
not pursued any further, either by the report or by the Government, at that time.   
 
Five years after the Select Committee’s report, Lord Ashley addressed the 
House of Commons ‘with feelings somewhat akin to despair’ regarding the 
employment of children in England. 71  Suggesting that the employment of 
children in collieries, as well as in other industries throughout the United 
 
64 ibid, 118 
65 ibid 
66 ibid, 311 
67 ibid 
68 ibid, 9 
69 ibid 
70 Boyd (n13) 26 
71 HC Deb 4 August 1840, vol 55, col 1260 
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Kingdom, amounted to ‘a system of slavery under the sanction of law’, Ashley 
moved for a Royal Commission to investigate the matter in detail.72 When the 
Royal Commission’s report was published in 1842 it unequivocally highlighted 
the ‘sufferings and degradation’ endured by the colliers on a daily basis.73 Once 
again, it was suggested that a number of ‘evils’ were inherent in the coal mining 
industry. These ‘evils’, it was submitted, included the previously emphasised 
issue of poor ventilation, but also included the employment of children 
underground and the inadequate education of the colliers. The report induced 
a ‘feeling of shame, terror, and indignation’ within the House of Commons,74 
with Ashley suggesting that members of Parliament should immediately 
‘address [themselves] to the evil’ uncovered.75 For the first time, Government 
inspection of mines and collieries was discussed by the legislature.  
 
 
The Mines and Collieries Act 1842 
 
In response to the Royal Commission’s report, Lord Ashley introduced a Bill 
into the House of Commons with the aim of prohibiting the employment of 
women in collieries and restricting the employment of children underground.76 
It cannot be denied that this Bill did address some of the evils that had been 
highlighted by the various inquiries that had gone before; for example, it sought 
to prohibit children under the age of thirteen being allowed to work 
underground. As has already been seen, George Stephenson had suggested 
in 1835 that neglect contributed to the frequent accidents, and this was 
confirmed when the Commissioners reported that ‘negligence forms an almost 
invariable element’ of the majority of colliery accidents.77 By removing young 
children from the collieries it was hoped that they would have been replaced 
 
72 ibid, col 1269 
73 The Condition and Treatment of The Children Employed in the Mines and Collieries of The 
United Kingdom (William Strange 1842) III 
74 HC Deb 7 June 1842, vol 63, col 1321 
75 ibid, col 1320  
76 A Bill to Prohibit the Employment of Women and Girls in Mines and Collieries, to Regulate 
the Employment of Boys, and Make Provisions for the Safety of Persons Working Therein HC 
Bill (1842) [298]  
77 Children’s Employment Commission, First Report of the Commissioners: Mines (C (1st 
Series) 380, 1842) 142 
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with more competent workers, which would have reduced the frequency of 
accidents through carelessness. In spite of this the Bill had one central flaw: it 
did not make provision for Government inspection of mines and collieries. As 
such, the content of the Bill was arguably unenforceable, as there was no way 
of monitoring who was employed in each colliery or what their role was. When 
he introduced the Bill to Parliament, Ashley suggested that inspection was 
‘altogether impossible; and, indeed, if it were possible, it would not be safe’.78 
This opinion was not, however, shared by everyone; when the Bill was 
resubmitted to the House of Commons following the debate and committee 
stages, provision for the appointment of Government inspectors had been 
made.79 After receiving Royal Assent on 10 August 1842, the Bill came into 
force as the Mines and Collieries Act 1842.80  
 
Under this new law, an inspector of mines and collieries could be appointed ‘if 
and when… fit’.81 This occurred on 14 December 1843 when Hugh Seymour 
Tremenheere was selected as the first Government inspector of mines and 
collieries with, what Edmonds and Edmonds have described as, a ‘rather vague 
mandate’.82 This is, indeed, an accurate summary of the position; the legislation 
under which Tremenheere was appointed gave him the power to enter and 
examine any mine or colliery so that he could report on whether the provisions 
of the 1842 Act were being complied with. 83  In addition to this legislative 
requirement, Tremenheere was also asked in his letter of employment to 
‘secure to the labourers employed in mines and collieries the benefits 
guaranteed to them by Parliament and to bring to justice those who by stealth 
violate the law’.84  
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The result was that Tremenheere ‘was on new ground’ in relation to 
Government inspection of mines and collieries;85 he did not have a predecessor 
to look to, nor could he look to the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 as a definitive 
guide to his role. It is well documented that the procession of the Act through 
Parliament was tumultuous, with there being great disagreement on what 
exactly an inspector’s role would be, and so any reference to the numerous 
Parliamentary debates would have been fruitless.86  As has already been seen, 
the concept of a Government inspector came to be regarded, at least to the 
general public, as ‘the panacea of the numerous evils which attended colliery 
operations’ in the nineteenth century, 87  with a panacea being defined as 
‘something that will solve all problems’.88  It must, therefore, be considered to 
what extent Tremenheere’s appointment as a Government inspector actually 
amounted to a solution for the ‘evils’ that were commonly associated with coal 
mining in the nineteenth century.   
 
In order to answer this question Tremenheere’s method of inspection must be 
analysed, and it is in this analysis that the first criticism of Tremenheere may 
be found. While the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 gave him the power to enter 
and examine all mines and collieries, which included any ‘works, buildings, and 
machinery’, he never descended a mineshaft in order to examine the 
subterranean workings of a colliery.89 As a result of this, Wellbourne was critical 
of Tremenheere’s appointment, suggesting that the Government had shown 
‘little wisdom’ when making its choice.90 Welbourne went on to suggest that 
Tremenheere’s ‘single source of information seems to have been the after-
dinner conversation’ he had with the colliery owners, thus disregarding the 
interests of the colliers themselves. 91  One would suggest, however, that 
Welbourne’s criticism of Tremenheere is largely without solid foundation and 
does not withstand scrutiny.  
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To begin with, Welbourne suggested that Tremenheere was not a suitable 
choice for the first Government inspector of mines and collieries, but did not 
give any reasoning for such an assertion. Tremenheere was, in fact, familiar 
with Government inspection; in 1839 he had been appointed as the first 
Government inspector of schools. In this role Tremenheere travelled the 
country reporting on the educational standards in each part of it, observing the 
different health standards, and undertaking an analysis of the correlation 
between occupation and disease out of his own interest in the matter.92 Most 
significantly, Tremenheere showed a particular interest in the mining population 
during his time as inspector of schools. For example, Tremenheere desired to 
draw the attention of the Committee of Council on Education to the ‘lamentable 
deficiency of the means of elementary’ education in the mining districts, 93 
suggesting that this was an ‘evil’ in its own right.94 As a result, his appointment 
‘was not so abrupt a transition as appears at first sight’.95 Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the method of inspection he had developed as the first schools 
inspector was easily transferrable to his role as the first mines and collieries 
inspector. Just as nineteenth century schools were ‘scattered in small units over 
the country and jealously guarded by local management committees’, the 
collieries were similarly distributed with, arguably, even more secretive 
proprietors.96 In light of Tremenheere’s background in inspection, which is well 
documented and so should have been easily discoverable by Welbourne, it is 
difficult to endorse his view that the appointment showed little wisdom on the 
part of the Government.  
 
In spite of this, one cannot help but wonder on what basis Welbourne made his 
observations, and whether there is any merit to them at all. As previously 
highlighted, John Buddle appears to have ‘favoured casual inspection by 
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mining engineers acting in an advisory capacity only’, rather than the official 
office of inspector that Tremenheere was appointed to.97 Tremenheere was not 
a mining engineer, nor did he have any intimate knowledge of the coal trade; 
prior to his appointment as schools inspector he had practiced as a barrister. 
This may be considered an oversight on the part of the Government, as a 
petition presented to Parliament in 1847 by the colliers demanded that 
Government inspectors should be appointed from ‘men acquainted with colliery 
work’. 98  Clearly Tremenheere did not fall within this category, and so his 
appointment may be criticised, to a limited extent, on this basis. Such a criticism 
does not, however, extend as far as Welbourne’s in suggesting that 
Tremenheere’s appointment showed little wisdom by the Government. While it 
is true that he did not have the experience of working in a colliery, Tremenheere 
did have the necessary inspecting experience relevant for this role and did 
show an active interest in the coal mining trade. As a result, his appointment 
was reasonable in the circumstances.      
 
Welbourne’s second criticism, that Tremenheere collected his information from 
the colliery owners in after dinner conversation, is undoubtedly unfair. When 
analysing Tremenheere’s reports as mines and collieries inspector it is clear 
that he placed the colliers at the centre of his investigations. For example, in 
his first report, published in 1844, he clearly explained that he met with the 
colliers ‘at all the works’ he visited. 99  Welbourne’s argument can also be 
undermined when examining Tremenheere’s 1850 report. Here Tremenheere 
reported on the ‘several just grievances which [produced] irritation and distrust 
in the minds of’ the colliers, which he was able to ascertain through discussions 
he had with them.100 Such grievances included the frequent accidents, the 
lengthy shift work, and the unreliable payment of wages by the colliery 
owners. 101  These complaints by the colliers can also be included in the 
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definition of ‘evils’ for the purposes of this project, and it is clear that 
Tremenheere was all too aware of their existence.  
 
Welbourne’s criticism of Tremenheere appears to have been drawn from his 
unique method of inspection; once he had completed his examination 
Tremenheere would allow the person under scrutiny to read all of his notes, 
which would go on to form the basis of his annual reports.102 In his private 
memoirs Tremenheere recalled that ‘at first a large proportion of the employers 
were very suspicious’ of this method,103 but that ‘each and all were anxious to 
show [him] in [his] subsequent visits that “they were better than they were when 
[he] first saw them”’.104 The result of this was that Tremenheere was able to 
build trusting relationships with those in charge of the collieries, but was also 
able to highlight areas of improvement without publicly condemning the mining 
practices. This brought the issues to the attention of the colliery managers who, 
in Tremenheere’s opinion, often endeavoured to remedy them before his next 
visit. While it cannot be denied that there were public officials who ‘had 
sycophantic reverence’ for the nineteenth century coal owners,105 it would not 
be just to include Tremenheere in this group. It is true that he relied on his 
discussions with the colliery owners and managers when preparing his reports, 
but this was not his only source of information; as his reports show, he gave 
just as much weight to his discussions with the colliers themselves.  
 
As has been seen, Tremenheere’s reports often highlighted the hardships 
faced by the colliers, ranging from ‘the absence of superintendence’106 to the 
‘disregard of cleanliness in their persons and houses’.107 What is missing from 
these reports, however, is the advancement and implementation of any form of 
remedy by Tremenheere. While he was able to identify the so called ‘evils’ he 
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was not able to take any action to resolve the majority of them, and so it would 
not be suitable to say that Tremenheere was a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ 
that attended colliery operations during the nineteenth century. For example, 
the issue of poor ventilation was prominent in many of Tremenheere’s reports. 
In 1844 he reported that ‘defective ventilation was a common topic of complaint 
at many of the works’ he visited,108 and by 1850 he was reporting that it was 
still ‘a subject of complaint among the men’.109 As previously highlighted, John 
Buddle had unequivocally stated in 1814 that a ‘judicious application’ of 
sufficient ventilation was the most important step to be taken in preventing 
explosions within a coal mine.110 In light of this statement by Buddle, together 
with the complaints of the colliers, it may be expected that Tremenheere would 
have taken steps to secure adequate ventilation across the country. Indeed, he 
should have been able to do this by recording, reporting and sharing the 
examples of good ventilation practice that he encountered, where ‘every 
attention was said to be scrupulously paid’.111 Tremenheere did not do this.  
 
In fact, the only action that Tremenheere ever took in his capacity as 
Government inspector of mines and collieries was to ensure that convictions 
were obtained in relation to the employment of women, and the employment of 
children under the age of ten, in collieries. It is reported that he instructed 
‘professional gentlemen’ to collect evidence to be brought before the 
magistrates in order to convict those who breached the provisions of the Mines 
and Collieries Act 1842. 112  As a result, he obtained, amongst others, the 
dismissal of thirty women from the Rhymney Company’s collieries and the 
dismissal of numerous children under the age of ten from across the country.113 
Certainly the employment of women and children was regarded as an ‘evil’ 
associated with coal mining at that time; it was one of the ‘subterranean terrors’ 
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that had been brought to the forefront of nineteenth century awareness by the 
First Report of the Children’s Employment Commission in 1842.114 However 
this represented just one of the many issues that the colliers were faced with in 
their employment, and yet Tremenheere was not even able to satisfactorily 
remedy this particular ‘evil’.  
 
To begin with, he accepted that the convictions he secured relating to women 
and children were without ‘any very permanent effect’. 115 It has also been 
reported that in some cases he ‘simply declined’ to bring any action against 
those who continued to breach the provisions of the Mines and Collieries Act 
1842.116 This may appear to be quite a shocking decision on the face of it, 
especially when considering that as recently as 2012 the courts of the United 
Kingdom have accepted that risk is ‘necessarily inherent and inevitable in 
underground mining’ 117  and that it remains ‘unpleasant and dangerous 
work’.118 In spite of this Tremenheere’s decision should be placed in context; it 
has already been seen that the convictions he secured did not act as a deterrent 
and so, to a certain extent, it may be suggested that they were, in fact, useless. 
The offences often resumed again once the prosecutions had been secured 
due to the fact that ‘the capital invested in exploiting’ the mines yielded such 
high returns for those with a financial interest in the collieries;119 the ends 
justified the means in the minds of the owners and managers. As a result, 
Tremenheere appears to have made his decision not to act on the basis that to 
do so would be a waste of public time and money.   
 
As his decision allowed a so-called ‘evil’ to be perpetuated, it is clear that 
Tremenheere was not able to be the panacea for the ‘evils’ of the coal trade 
during the nineteenth century. Yet it is difficult to criticise Tremenheere for this; 
indeed, in his reports Tremenheere lamented that ‘the Legislature had not 
 
114 Angela John, By The Sweat of Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal Mines (2nd 
edn, Routledge & Kegan Paul plc 1983) 12 
115 Tremenheere’s Report of 1847 (n112) 4  
116 Webb (n92) 358 
117 Davies & Others v The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (As Successor 
in Title to the Liabilities of the British Coal Corporation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1380, [2012] 10 
WLUK 750 [5]   
118 ibid, [7]  
119 Webb (n92) 358 
 24 
thought proper’120 when rushing the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 through 
Parliament at ‘railroad speed’.121 For this reason, the Mines and Collieries Act 
1842 must be examined in further detail when considering whether 
Tremenheere was ever in the position to have been the panacea called for 
during the nineteenth century.  
 
It Is More Convenient to Prevent the Passage of a Law, than to Declare It 
Void after It Has Passed 
 
When Lord Ashley introduced the initial Bill for the Mines and Collieries Act 
1842 into the House of Commons, he suggested that it would have obviated ‘a 
large proportion of the mischiefs’ that prevailed in the mining industry.122 In 
spite of Lord Ashley’s confidence on this matter, the passage of the Bill through 
Parliament was met with great resistance from both Houses. Heesom has 
suggested that the draftsmanship of the Bill had been poor, especially in 
relation to Government inspection, and that this was the primary reason for the 
resistance.123 This was undeniably the case; the Marquess of Londonderry 
regarded the Bill as an example of ‘clumsy legislation’124 with others suggesting 
that the Bill should have been handled much more ‘cautiously and 
temperately’.125 
 
 In its original form the clause relating to inspection gave the inspectors wide 
powers to inquire into the state and condition of the mines and collieries, and 
yet the drafting of the clause made it entirely inoperative. 126  This point is 
highlighted most effectively when considering the Marquess of Londonderry’s 
criticism of it; he suggested that the clause would have allowed a colliery owner 
to say to the inspector: ‘You may go down the pit, and when you are down, you 
may remain there’. 127  By this he meant that there would have been no 
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obligation on the colliery owners to provide an inspector with access to their 
mines, nor would there have been any compulsion for the owners to furnish the 
inspectors with any equipment that they may have needed to do so. As a result, 
he suggested that the House of Lords should have insisted upon an ‘entire 
omission’ of the clause relating to inspection.128 This suggestion appears to 
have had some support in the House of Lords, as Lord Wharncliffe showed 
concern that inspectors may ‘inquire into the management of many things about 
which they have no business’.129 Rather than omit the clause entirely, it was 
amended so that the inspector would instead report on the condition of the 
miners rather than the condition of the mines.  
 
While the Marquess of Londonderry may be praised for drawing the attention 
of the House to the unenforceable nature of the clause, it would appear that he 
was privately attempting to ‘thwart its passage’;130 he expressed a desire to ‘put 
an end to’ the Bill in his private correspondence. 131 As a colliery owner, with 
‘manors, collieries, coal mines, and other hereditaments… [situated] in the 
County of Durham’,132 such behaviour further supports the argument, initially 
advanced by Boyd, that colliery owners always pursued a system of stifling all 
inquiry into the coal trade during the nineteenth century.133 Further, it also 
highlights the dominance of the doctrine of laissez-faire during the nineteenth 
century; the Earl of Radnor objected to the entire Bill on the grounds that it 
would cause great interference with the market of labour in the United 
Kingdom.134   
 
The amendment made to the Bill, although subtle, was not without 
consequence. It has been seen that the role of the inspector was initially going 
to be to inquire into, and report on, the condition of the mines and collieries in 
the United Kingdom. If this had gone unchallenged then Tremenheere’s role 
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would have been very different; his focus would have been very much on the 
infrastructure of the collieries, as opposed to the condition of the colliers 
themselves. As a result, the issues relating to the health and safety of the 
colliers would have been a priority, rather than the social conditions that 
Tremenheere found himself reporting on. With just one minor change to the 
wording of the Bill, the role of the inspector transformed completely. The result 
of this was that the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 did create the role of a 
Government inspector of mines and collieries, but that the term ‘inspector’ is 
misleading in this case.  
 
It has already been suggested that Tremenheere’s mandate was vague, and 
this becomes even more obvious when examining his role in further detail.135 
The legislation gave the inspector appointed under it three functions: to visit 
collieries in order to inquire whether the provisions of the Act were being 
complied with; to inquire into the condition of the colliers; and to prepare annual 
reports on the findings. Tremenheere did all of these things, and yet he has 
been consistently criticised for having ‘nothing to do with the technical 
management of the mines’, which may have encouraged better safety practices 
and thus reduced the number of accidents during his tenure as inspector.136 
The operation of the Mines and Collieries Act 1842, however, meant that 
Tremenheere was ‘in no way to concern himself with the management of 
mines’, and so criticism of Tremenheere for this is without foundation.137As a 
result, it would be better to regard Tremenheere as a ‘social investigator’ who 
reported on the social conditions of the mining population in the nineteenth 
century, rather than as an inspector with the power to make any progressive 
changes to the coal mining industry.138  
 
When considering whether Tremenheere was a panacea for the numerous 
‘evils’ that attended the coal mining trade in the nineteenth century, it has been 
seen that he was not, primarily because he was not able to advance any 
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remedies for these ‘evils’. It would, however, be wrong to criticise Tremenheere 
for this. It is clear, through examining the Mines and Collieries Act 1842, that 
Tremenheere was never in a position to be a panacea for these ‘evils’; his role 
simply did not allow for it. As a result, it is the authors of the Mines and Collieries 
Act 1842, together with those Parliamentary members who weakened its 
provisions, who should be criticised. The Act had the potential to introduce a 
panacea for these ‘evils’ in the form of an inspector, but did not go far enough 
in ensuring that the inspector had the necessary powers to make a tangible 
difference to the trade. Quite simply, the legislative intervention that the Act 

























Chapter Two  
Colliery Inquests  Further Government Inquiry  Legislative 
Reform  New Government Inspectors 
 
Chapter one demonstrated that the first Government inspector of mines and 
collieries was not a panacea for the numerous evils that attended colliery 
operations in the nineteenth century. It was also suggested that he should not 
be condemned for this; the main criticism should be directed towards the 
authors of the Mines and Collieries Act 1842, which, in spite of bringing ‘some 
indirect safety provisions to the collieries’,139 was largely inadequate in the 
circumstances. 140 Tremenheere both acknowledged and embraced the 
limitations of the legislation under which he was appointed; in addition to his 
appreciation that ‘the legislature had not thought proper’ when introducing the 
legislation,141 it may be suggested that Tremenheere used his annual reports 
as a platform for advocating more comprehensive inspection on the part of 
Government. In his 1847 report, Tremenheere highlighted the fact that colliery 
explosions and colliery management did not ‘strictly come within the letter of’ 
his role.142 As a result, Tremenheere encouraged the Government to form a 
new office of inspection that would focus on the mines and collieries 
themselves, including the management, ventilation and general safety 
practices. 143  It is somewhat ironic to note that the form of inspection 
Tremenheere advocated was, in fact, the form that his own office of inspection 
would have taken if not for the opposition of colliery owners in Parliament.144  
 
And They All Paid, They All Paid the Real Price of Coal, It Was Too High 
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During this time the conduct of the colliery managers and owners continued to 
amount to ‘a far from benign neglect’ of safety practices, resulting in further 
colliery accidents and loss of life. 145  For example, on 3 April 1845 a 
subterranean explosion at Killingworth Colliery resulted in the death of ten 
colliers. One of these colliers is reported to have been using a candle, rather 
than a safety lamp, as a source of light, which is thought to have ignited a 
quantity of gas.146 Effective safety lamps had been available for more than thirty 
years at the time of this particular incident; Clanny had developed a safety lamp 
in 1812, with both Stephenson and Davy, along with various others, producing 
variations in 1815.147 The Select Committee of 1835 had, in fact, suggested 
that ‘no employer of miners can be justified in allowing … interference with a 
due protection to the lives of his workpeople’.148 In order to achieve this, the 
Select Committee forcefully suggested that the use of safety lamps in place of 
candles should be ‘compelled by the owners’.149 Unfortunately, there was no 
way to enforce this suggestion; as has already been seen, the scope of 
Tremenheere’s role was limited, and compelling the colliery owners to observe 
the Select Committee’s recommendations was not within his power. It may be 
suggested, then, that the occurrence of accidents such as this supported 
Tremenheere’s suggestion that a new office of inspector should have been 
formed.  
 
The explosion at Killingworth Colliery is also significant when considering the 
inquest that followed. The coroner, Stephen Reed, was criticised for his 
‘unseemly haste’ in opening the proceedings.150 It was 4.30pm on Friday 4 
April, the day after the explosion, and four of the bodies had still not been 
located within the mine. 151  It has been noted that Reed refused to hear 
evidence from mining professionals, which had already been prepared in 
anticipation of the inquest, and rather dogmatically suggested that there was 
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no blame due to the colliery owners.152 Eventually a verdict of accidental death 
was recorded. It is clear, however, that the incident could have been prevented 
and Reed should have had the integrity to speak out on the issue. As a result, 
it may be suggested that Reed, unlike Tremenheere, did have ‘sycophantic 
reverence’ for the nineteenth century coal owners.153154 Reed was not the only 
public official, or more specifically not the only coroner, who can be placed in 
this category. This conduct can be observed when considering the explosion at 
Haswell Colliery, County Durham, on 28 September 1844, which killed ninety-
five colliers. This incident ‘has attracted much more interest from historians than 
other comparable disasters’, primarily because of the inquest rather than the 
explosion itself.155  
 
The coroner, Thomas Christopher Maynard, had acted as an agent of the 
Marquess of Londonderry during the 1837 General Election, and continued to 
do so until 1841.156 The Marquess of Londonderry owned ‘considerable mines 
in Durham’ and was arguably the strongest opponent of Government 
intervention in mines and collieries in Parliament.157 As a result, Maynard’s 
involvement in the inquest was immediately open to criticism; after all, it is ‘of 
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.158 With the benefit of hindsight 
it may be asked to what extent Maynard acted in the impartial and independent 
manner expected of coroners in the nineteenth century, which would ‘prevent 
juries from being manipulated into returning’ questionable verdicts. 159 
Immediately after the explosion, the Northumberland and Durham Miners’ 
Association acknowledged that the inquest would be a prime platform for 
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advancing their cause: that there were ‘unsafe conditions within mines and 
highlighting the need for legislation and Government interference’.160 In light of 
this, they intervened with solicitor William Prowting Roberts, who had become 
‘a terror to the mine owners’ through his previous involvement in colliery 
matters, representing the bereaved families at the inquest.161  
 
On the first day of the inquest Roberts applied for an adjournment, insisting that 
an independent colliery manager should inspect the mine. Maynard refused. 
Roberts then applied for an adjournment so that Government representatives 
could attend the inquest. Maynard, again, refused. Roberts persisted in his 
attempts at gaining an adjournment, emphasising that a further investigation 
into the incident was necessary, with Maynard finally granting his request at the 
end of the third day.162 In light of his repeated refusals, James and Ray have 
suggested that Maynard’s conduct amounted to a ‘biased handling of the 
case’.163 This is a convincing observation, especially when considering the 
1835 Select Committee’s recommendation that a fit and proper person should 
attend inquests relating to colliery deaths on behalf of the Government. 164 
Roberts was clearly aware of this recommendation by the Select Committee; 
he ‘petitioned the Prime Minister … that Government representatives should be 
sent to the inquest’ before the expiration of the adjournment. 165  Roberts’s 
petition was successful and Michael Faraday and Charles Lyell were selected 
to attend the inquest on behalf of the Government.   
 
Faraday and Lyell, unlike Tremenheere, insisted on inspecting the mine itself, 
where they discovered ‘some laxity in the safety procedures’ in place.166 It has 
been reported that during the inspection and, ‘much to his consternation, 
Faraday found that he was sitting on a bag of gunpowder while a naked candle 
was in use’.167 Following their investigations, Faraday and Lyell concluded ‘that 
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something was seriously amiss in mining safety’ and recognised the importance 
of further inquiry into the matter.168 It is clear that Faraday and Lyell were able 
to draw these conclusions through the subterranean inspection of a single 
mine, and so Tremenheere’s lack of underground inspection can be criticised 
once more. Indeed, it is possible that if Tremenheere had engaged in 
underground inspection then he may have been able to highlight the existence 
of such ‘evils’ before accidents like these occurred. However, such an argument 
requires hypothetical thought and does not reflect the reality of the situation, 
and so is an unreasonable one to make. As was demonstrated in chapter one, 
Tremenheere’s inspecting role was limited by statute and therefore he was 
never in a position to engage in such activity; as such, caution must be 
exercised when reflecting on Tremenheere’s actions. Once again, the criticism 
should be directed towards the authors of the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 
and the inadequate powers it conferred upon the inspector. The Haswell 
Colliery explosion further highlighted the need for a new office of inspector, 
much like the one proposed by Tremenheere in 1847, with greater powers and 
a much clearer mandate.     
 
Their experience at the Haswell Colliery inquest prompted Faraday and Lyell to 
publish a report outlining their findings. It may be suggested that the content of 
the report was in no way surprising; it drew attention to many of the ‘evils’ 
already highlighted by previous reports, Select Committees and commissions. 
For example, it suggested that: ventilation was in need of ‘improvement’;169 that 
safety lamps should be used rather than candles;170 and that the standard of 
education in the mining districts should be addressed.171 In response to the 
report, the United Committee of the Coal Trade appointed a sub-committee to 
consider the recommendations made by Faraday and Lyell. Boyd has 
suggested that the sub-committee’s response was ‘vague and unsatisfactory’ 
 
168 ibid, 223  
169 Home Department, Copy of the Report of Messrs. Lyell and Faraday to the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, on the Subject of the Explosion at the Haswell Collieries in 
September Last: - Also, Copy of the Report Addressed to the United Committee of the Coal 
Trade by the Special Committee Appointed to Take into Consideration the Said Report of 
Messrs. Lyell and Faraday; and Copy of the Reply to Messrs. Lyell and Faraday Thereto (C 
(1st series) 232, 1845) 4  
170 ibid, 7 
171 ibid, 12 
 33 
and, given the serious nature of the ‘evils’ highlighted in the report, such an 
observation was reasonable.172 The sub-committee disregarded the scientific 
basis of Faraday and Lyell’s report, suggesting that ‘practical information which 
can only be gained by experience’ was the most important factor when looking 
to improve the safety within a mine. 173  For the sub-committee to have 
overlooked the science behind Faraday and Lyell’s report at this time is 
arguably unexpected and represents a rather inflexible stance; after all, during 
the nineteenth century ‘public enthusiasm for science began to grow’, 174 
resulting in a ‘Victorian fascination with science’.175 The vague and intransigent 
nature of the sub-committee’s reply, however, did nothing to assuage the 
growing concerns of the colliers regarding their safety. They proceeded to 
formulate a petition for further Government inquiry into colliery accidents, which 
Thomas Duncomb presented to Parliament on 11 March 1845.176 
 
Doubt Comes in at the Window When Inquiry Is Denied at the Door 
 
The Government response to the Haswell Colliery disaster and the colliers’ 
petition submitted by Thomas Duncomb was arguably inadequate when 
considered as a whole. Clearly the so-called ‘evils’ that had been within the 
contemplation of the legislature when passing the Mines and Collieries Act 
1842 were still present within the mining industry. As a result it should have 
been apparent to the Government that the office of inspector, as held by 
Tremenheere, was not the panacea for the numerous evils that attended 
colliery operations at the time. It may be expected that further decisive action 
would have been taken in order to address the issue, but this was not the case.  
 
The Government response was to appoint Sir Henry de la Beche and Dr Lyon 
Playfair to inquire into the causes of explosions in mines. Their report, 
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presented in 1846, repeated many of the previously identified ‘evils’ and 
suggested that they ‘might be at least mitigated by the careful and judicious 
inspection… by competent persons’. 177  Once again, more comprehensive 
Government inspection, in the form to be advocated by Tremenheere in his 
1847 report, was being suggested as a remedy for these ‘evils’. In spite of this, 
the scope of Tremenheere’s role was not widened, nor was an alternative office 
of inspection created. Indeed, the concept of wider Government inspection was 
‘repeated again and again in the course of further investigations’ into colliery 
safety.178 Attempts to address the issue of safety were ultimately defeated in 
Parliament; Thomas Duncomb introduced a Bill, which would have allowed for 
the appointment of three Government inspectors of mines and collieries, to the 
House of Commons on 16 June 1847,179 but was forced to withdraw it shortly 
afterwards following pressure from the Home Secretary. 180  Any notion of 
legislative reform stagnated after this point.   
 
The catalyst for more comprehensive inquiry came in January 1849 and was, 
regrettably, yet another colliery explosion. This explosion, which killed seventy-
five colliers, occurred at the Darley Main Colliery in South Yorkshire. The mine 
was subsequently found to be inadequately ventilated.181 In common with the 
explosions at Killingworth and Haswell, it is the ensuing inquest that is of 
particular interest. While the jury returned a verdict of accidental death in this 
case, they requested that the coroner, Thomas Badger, made it known to the 
Government that they believed it would be advisable ‘that they should appoint 
a scientific and practical person to … inspect the collieries’.182 To the jury there 
was ‘no doubt that the manifest errors and defects of its ventilation would have 
been strongly pointed out’ if there had been an inspector with satisfactory 
powers operating in the industry.183 As a result, there was a widespread belief 
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that the explosion ‘would in all probability not have occurred’ if such an 
inspector were in existence.184 At this point the defects in the existing office of 
inspector were becoming much more apparent, leading to Lord Carlisle 
introducing a Bill into the House of Lords in response to the ‘appalling number 
of accidents that had occurred’. 185  Following its progression through 
Parliament, the Bill came into force as the Coal Mines Inspection Act 1850.186  
 
A Bill of Essential Consequence 
 
As with the legislation that had gone before, the Bill was met with resistance in 
both Houses of Parliament. In the Lords the Earl of Lonsdale voiced his concern 
that the Bill would ‘prove a great annoyance to coal owners’,187 and in the 
Commons Benjamin Disraeli believed it to be ‘a piece of hasty and ill-
considered legislation’. 188  In spite of this opposition, which was moderate 
compared to that of the 1842 legislation, the Act did address some of the issues 
that had been raised regarding inspection of mines and collieries. It should be 
noted, however, that this Act did not repeal any part of the Mines and Collieries 
Act 1842. As a result, there were two offices of mines and collieries inspector 
in existence simultaneously; there was the 1842 office held by Tremenheere on 
the one hand, and the newly created 1850 office on the other. It has already 
been seen that Tremenheere’s role should be regarded as more of a ‘social 
investigator’ rather than an inspector, and the differences between the two 
offices should be considered in more detail.189  
 
The most significant aspect of the 1850 Act was that it gave the inspectors the 
power to inquire into the state and condition of the mines and collieries.190 
These inspectors had a much wider scope than Tremenheere ever had under 
the 1842 Act; while he was limited to inquiring into the social condition of the 
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colliers, the new inspectors were focused on identifying any defects in mines 
and collieries which were likely to place the colliers in any form of danger.191 
Such a power clearly reflects the recommendations of the previous Select 
Committees, reports and commissions, as well as the calls of the jury in the 
Darley Main Colliery inquest. It has already been seen that the limitations of 
Tremenheere’s role meant that he could not be a panacea for the numerous 
evils that attended colliery operations in the nineteenth century; however, the 
wider powers conferred on the new inspectors meant that they did have the 
potential to be such a panacea.  
 
In addition to the clearer focus for the inspectors, the Act also addressed the 
issue, first highlighted by the Select Committee of 1835, of inquests. Under the 
Act, coroners were compelled to adjourn an inquest following an accident at a 
colliery until the Secretary of State had been given notice.192 This had not been 
a requirement under the old law, and so represented a shift towards examining 
the accidents in greater detail with a view to preventing similar incidents in the 
future. The Act also introduced a penalty enforceable against any colliery owner 
or agent who refused or neglected to furnish the inspectors with the means 
necessary to carry out their role; for each offence the owner or agent could be 
fined between five and ten pounds.193 Once again, this represented a shift of 
power; authority had remained with the colliery owners under the 1842 Act, but 
with the 1850 Act this was reduced with greater influence passing to the 
inspectors. This further supports the suggestion that the inspectors now had 
the potential to be the panacea for the numerous evils that attended colliery 
operations in the nineteenth century.  
 
As identified in chapter one, Tremenheere’s appointment as the first 
Government inspector of mines and collieries was criticised because of his lack 
of experience in the coal mining industry. Such an oversight was not repeated 
when the new inspectors were appointed in 1851.  Indeed, Boyd observed that 
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colliery owners had feared the appointment of inspectors who were not familiar 
with the practicalities of coal mining, and who would insist on imposing 
impossible or expensive measures. 194  Such fears were relieved when the 
Government appointed Matthias Dunn, Joseph Dickinson, Charles Morton and 
John Kenyon Blackwell as the first four Government inspectors. All of these 
men had been connected to the coal trade in one way or another before their 
appointment, and so represented a suitable choice by the Government. For the 
purposes of this project, particular emphasis will be placed on Matthias Dunn, 
the inspector initially responsible for the collieries within Northumberland, 
Durham, Cumberland and Scotland. It has long been recognised that ‘of all the 
coal-fields in England … that of Northumberland and Durham [was] the most 
important’, and so it may be suggested that Dunn was the inspector with the 
potential to make the biggest impact on mining safety during the nineteenth 
century.195 
 
Unreasonable Haste Is the Direct Road to Error 
 
It cannot be denied that the 1850 Act recognised the deficiencies in the 1842 
Act, and did seek to provide a remedy in the form of more comprehensive 
Government inspection. However, the Act did not go far enough; it appears 
satisfactory on the surface, but a more detailed analysis reveals too many 
inadequacies.  For example, the inspectors were appointed to inquire into the 
state and condition of the mines and collieries with a view to identifying defects 
giving rise to danger. While this is indeed the role that had been proposed for 
many years, the inspectors were limited in what action they could take if they 
discovered such a defect. They were restricted to bringing the defects to the 
attention of the colliery owner or agent, who may or may not have taken action. 
If the owner or agent did not take any action, the inspector could make a further 
report to the Secretary of State. Such a process would have taken a 
considerable amount of time and, in the meantime, mining operations would 
have continued as usual. The inspectors were not able bring a halt to work, and 
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so the colliers were still exposed to the danger in question. As a result, one 
would argue that the power conferred upon the inspectors were illusory, to a 
certain extent, as they were restricted in practice. In a similar way that 
Tremenheere’s power was limited to observing and reporting, the new 
inspecting role was also limited to observing and reporting. The inspectors had 
no means of enforcing a remedy, which reflected a major inadequacy in the 
Coal Mines Inspection Act 1850. 
 
The limitations of the inspecting role are also apparent when observing the 
instructions given to them on their appointment. The Home Office informed the 
inspectors that they could not enforce any particular mode of ventilation or 
working within the collieries, nor could they give any advice unless solicited by 
a colliery owner or agent.196 Attention must again be drawn to John Buddle’s 
advice, published in 1814, regarding ventilation; he had warned that the 
adequate ventilation of a colliery was the most significant step in preventing 
colliery explosions and so should be judiciously attended to at all times.197 In 
spite of this, ventilation remained a contentious issue, and there was great 
disagreement as to the most effective method available.198 As has already 
been seen, inadequate ventilation was a significant contributory factor in a 
number of colliery explosions, such as the previously highlighted explosions at 
Felling Colliery in 1812 and at Haswell Colliery in 1849. The inspectors should 
have been given the power to intervene where necessary. Similarly, there were 
numerous modes of working available, each with their own advantages and 
disadvantages, and yet the inspectors could not make recommendations to the 
colliery owners or agents regarding this either.199 The ‘working’ of a colliery 
refers to the method of extracting coal from the ground; evidently the main 
objective in any colliery was to extract as much coal as possible from the mine, 
leading to the development of a number of techniques to do this. Colliery 
owners and managers were often criticised for their choice of working, as they 
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would often leave insufficient coal in the ground to support the weight of the 
earth above, frequently leading to the collapse of the mine. Again, such a 
limitation would suggest that the new office of inspector, while having potential, 
could not in practice amount to a panacea for even the most obvious of the 
numerous evils that attended colliery operations in the nineteenth century.  
 
In common with the other three inspectors who were appointed under the 1850 
Act, Matthias Dunn was well acquainted with the coal trade. Unlike 
Tremenheere, however, Dunn had considerable experience in managing 
collieries; he had been employed as deputy colliery manager under John 
Buddle and was subsequently appointed as a colliery manager for the Hetton 
Coal Company.200 While Bartrip has questioned the motivation for individuals 
accepting the post of inspector, highlighting the controversial question of their 
attitudes towards reform and regulation both before and after appointment, it 
would not be just to question Dunn’s intent.201 Prior to his appointment as 
inspector, Dunn showed deep concern for the welfare of the colliers. For 
example, during the Second Cholera Pandemic of 1826 to 1837 Dunn kept 
detailed records of how the infection was impacting the lives of his workforce.202 
He had also been vocal on the issue of colliery safety, potentially influenced by 
his early associations with John Buddle.203 For instance: he contributed to the 
1835 Select Committee into accidents in coal mines;204 he actively encouraged 
the development of an effective safety lamp;205 and, at his own expense, he 
made available numerous works promoting safe mining practices. 206  As a 
result, Dunn was impeccably suited for the role of Government inspector, 
further reinforcing the notion that the new office of inspector had the potential 
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to be the panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ that attended colliery operations in 
the nineteenth century.  
 
It is regrettable, however, that the limitations of the role did not allow Dunn’s 
wealth of knowledge to be shared with the collieries under his control. Dunn, 
along with the other inspectors, was perfectly placed to advocate safer mining 
practices, and yet the legislation stopped short of providing the platform to do 
so. The inspecting role reflected the one called for by the various reports and 
committees over the years; it moved the focus of the inspection away from the 
social conditions of the colliers towards the issue of safety within the trade. Yet 
the enforcement powers that should have provided the foundation of the role 
were missing. In much the same way as the 1842 Act created an inspector 
whose primary role was on reporting, so too did the 1850 Act. As a result, one 
must agree with Bartrip’s observation that ‘it is hard to maintain that the Act 
took state intervention very much further’.207 It is true that the new office of 
Government inspection had the potential to be the panacea for the numerous 
‘evils’ that attended colliery operations in the nineteenth century, but it cannot 
be denied that the limitations of the role meant that, in practice, it could not 
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Chapter Three 
Washington Colliery  Select Committees  Coal Mines Act 
1855  Burradon Colliery  New Hartley Disaster 
 
By 1851, sixteen years after they had first been proposed, the Government 
inspectors of mines and collieries did not represent a panacea for the multitude 
of ‘evils’ associated with colliery operations. This was not the result of 
incompetence on the part of the inspectorate; the inspectors were all suitably 
qualified to hold their positions. It was, in fact, the product of the weak legal 
basis on which they had been appointed. The focus of the Mines and Collieries 
Act 1842 had been diverted by the colliery owners in Parliament, resulting in 
the appointment of a mines and collieries inspector who was in no way to 
concern himself with the operation of mines and collieries. Similarly the Coal 
Mines Inspection Act 1850 was undermined in Parliament, although it did prove 
to be more effective than the 1842 Act. This resulted in inspectors with a clear 
focus on the safety of mines and collieries, but without the necessary powers 
of intervention and enforcement. While the 1842 Act continued to operate 
unaltered, the 1850 Act was subject to criticism from its introduction, leading to 
further inquiry and reform. 
 
The Inquiry Constantly Is What Will Please, Not What Will Benefit the 
People. In Such a Government There can be Nothing but Temporary 
Expedient, Fickleness, and Folly  
 
The controversies surrounding the ventilation of mines, for example, continued 
after the appointment of the Government inspectors under the Coal Mines 
Inspection Act 1850. In his first report, dated 1851, Inspector Dunn highlighted 
the fact that colliery managers frequently disagreed as to the best mode of 
ventilation, of which there were many, to be employed in their mines.208 Indeed, 
he was critical of the widespread deficiency of adequate ventilation in the 
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Scottish collieries, which he considered to be a great detriment to the health of 
the colliers.209 In spite of these concerns, it should be remembered that Dunn 
was generally prohibited from commenting on the ventilation system in place at 
a colliery unless his opinion was solicited from the colliery owner or agent.210 
While the inspectors had the power to highlight and report examples of 
inadequate ventilation to the Secretary of State, they were unable to 
recommend improvements that would have made adequate ventilation systems 
more effective. This was one of the central flaws of the role; it did not give the 
inspectors the authority to share their knowledge with the collieries under their 
control in order to promote better safety practices. Dunn was not alone in 
reporting deficiencies in the ventilation of collieries; 
Inspectors Morton and Dickinson also used their reports in order to stress the 
issue.211 Consequently, it was clear that poor ventilation was not unique to the 
coalfields under Dunn’s control; it was a nation wide problem, and so any 
comment has national, as opposed to merely regional, significance. Attention 
was most notably drawn to this issue following the explosion at Washington 
Colliery in 1851, which killed thirty-five colliers.212  
 
The explosion at Washington Colliery was not the first to occur at the site; there 
had been previous fatal explosions attributable to the ventilation system as 
recently as 1849.213 The 1851 inquest concluded that this explosion was also 
the result of an inadequate ventilation system being in place.214 The jury went 
further. They suggested that if Dunn had been given the opportunity of 
inspecting the colliery in order to make recommendations for improving the 
ventilation system, and had been able to ensure that recommendations for 
improvement were put in place, then the explosion would not have occurred.215 
Dunn was of the same opinion, but also voiced his concern that colliery owners 
and managers appeared reluctant to ask for his professional opinion regarding 
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ventilation.216 This account from Dunn emphasised the limitations of his role; it 
showed that the colliery owners and agents were unwilling to engage with the 
inspectors in order to ensure that enduring ‘evils’, such as poor ventilation, were 
addressed. As a result, even the most rudimentary ‘evils’ were not remedied 
through the introduction of the inspectors, and so it cannot be said that the new 
office of inspector was any more of a panacea than the previous office.  
 
In addition to the explosion at Washington Colliery, there were several other 
colliery accidents in 1851, resulting in a significant number of deaths. In the 
seven month period between November 1850 and June 1851 the inspectors 
recorded five hundred and twenty four colliery related deaths.217 This figure did 
not, however, include any of the fatalities that had occurred in Wales and did 
not cover a twelve month period. In order to address this, the inspectors 
predicted that there would be a total of one thousand one hundred and fifty 
colliery related deaths throughout the United Kingdom in the year 1851.218 
Such an estimate caused great alarm in both Houses of Parliament, resulting 
in members once more considering colliery safety to be a ‘pressing 
emergency’.219 This led to the appointment of a further Select Committee, to 
inquire, once again, into the recurrent accidents that occurred at the 
collieries. 220  Unlike the previous Select Committees, which had frequently 
attached little weight to the preceding investigations, this Select Committee 
recognised the ‘extensive, important, and apparently so accurate’ information 
that had been prepared to date.221 With this information in mind, the Select 
Committee criticised the fact that the beneficial suggestions propounded by the 
previous Committee’s had been given ‘so little attention’.222 They went on to 
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outline their own recommendations for colliery safety, including proposed 
reforms of the recently created office of Government inspector.  
 
The first criticism made in relation to inspection was that too few appointments 
had been made under the Coal Mines Inspection Act 1850. Initially the 
Government had only appointed four inspectors, though this had been 
increased to six shortly afterwards. As a result, each inspector was responsible 
for examining and reporting on roughly four hundred collieries. This was clearly 
an outrage; it would have been impossible for the inspectors to visit every 
colliery under their control in the space of one year.223 In light of this, the content 
of the inspectors’ official reports fell under scrutiny; it is doubtful that the reports 
returned to Parliament reflected the reality of the situation. The reports 
represent generalisations made by the inspectors based upon what they had 
observed over the course of the year. While the reports were useful when 
specific events, such as the Washington Colliery explosion, were discussed, 
they could not be relied on as a comprehensive summary of the nineteenth 
century collieries in the United Kingdom. The fact that the inspectors were 
responsible for such a large number of collieries can be criticised further. As 
the inspectors were unable to visit all of the collieries under their control, it 
cannot be denied that ‘evils’ would have remained undetected and unresolved. 
It is not possible that the inspectors appointed under the 1850 Act were any 
more of a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ associated with colliery operations 
than the inspector who had been appointed under the 1842 Act. There simply 
were not enough of them to have any substantial effect. 
 
The members of the 1852 Select Committee were also critical of the limited 
powers conferred on the inspectors under the 1850 Act.224 They suggested that 
the inspectors should have been given the power to enforce penalties where 
they discovered examples of danger, especially when this had led to 
fatalities. 225  Echoing George Stephenson’s suggestion, made during the 
course of the 1835 Select Committee’s investigations, it was also advised that 
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the inspectors should have been given the power to suspend work at a colliery 
until an identified danger had been remedied.226 Such a power would have 
undoubtedly strengthened the role of the inspectors; they would have been able 
to ensure that colliers were no longer exposed to the dangers, or ‘evils’, and 
would have been able to guarantee that they were resolved before work 
resumed.  
 
The suggestions made by the Select Committee did not, however, go far 
enough. They were too reserved, primarily because they considered the 
inspectors’ powers to be a ‘delicate matter’.227 The Committee did not address 
the fact that the inspectors were unable to give unsolicited advice relating to 
the ventilation or mode of working. The explosion at Washington Colliery, and 
Dunn’s opinion that the explosion would have been prevented if he had been 
able to give advice relating to ventilation, could have provided the foundation 
for further intervention on the part of the inspectors. Unfortunately, the 
Committee did not recognise this, and so were unable to build a strong enough 
case in favour of more comprehensive powers for the inspectors.  As a result, 
the Government inspectors in 1852 did not amount to a panacea for the ‘evils’ 
associated with colliery operations, especially considering the limited powers 
that they had at the time. It is clear, however, that they had the potential to be 
a panacea if they had been given more extensive powers, including, but not 
limited to, those recommended by the 1852 Select Committee.   
 
When the Select Committee published their report it was met with widespread 
condemnation. The evidence given by mining experts had been disregarded, 
especially in relation to ventilation, and so the recommendations were largely 
ignored. 228  Regrettably, this also applied to the suggested reforms of the 
inspectorate, with the consequence that the inspectors remained unable to be 
the panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ that attended colliery operations at the 
time.  
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You Cannot Discover New Roads with Old Maps  
 
The Select Committee of 1852 had no impact on the law relating to the coal 
mining industry. In practice, the inspectors continued to be of limited use in 
promoting safety within the collieries. Dunn did report in 1855 that there had 
been an overall decrease in the aggregate number of colliery deaths in his 
district since the introduction of the inspectors in 1851.229 However, this fact 
should be approached with caution; while there was an improvement in Dunn’s 
district, there was no noticeable improvement in the United Kingdom overall.  
The reports returned by the inspectors showed that, on the whole, the number 
of accidents and colliery related deaths continued to occur at the same 
frequency as they had since accurate records began in 1851.230 Indeed, Dunn 
did not believe the improvements in his district to have been caused by 
Government inspection at all; he considered the ‘universal feeling of 
improvement’ which had been spreading throughout the industry to be the real 
catalyst for change.231 This was a clear reference to the various organisations 
that had been formed with a view to preventing accidents in mines, such as the 
Royal School of Mines in 1851 and the North of England Institute of Mining 
Engineers in 1852. 232  The Home Secretary, Lord Palmerston, who ‘was 
sensitive to public opinion and respected its power’, recognised this growing 
movement, as well as the inadequacies of the 1852 Select Committee, and 
supported the formation of a further Select Committee.233  
 
This Select Committee also focused on colliery accidents, including the most 
effective means of preventing them, but was much more comprehensive than 
previous inquiries. Investigations began in 1853 and continued into 1854, with 
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a total of four reports being published.234 While the Government inspectors had 
been referred to in preceding investigations, these references were limited and 
did not examine the role in detail. As a result, the 1853-1854 Select Committee 
should have been the first critical analysis of the role, which would have allowed 
the Committee to make recommendations for further improving the efficacy of 
the inspectors. The Committee did analyse the inspectors and it did suggest 
reforms to the office. Unfortunately, the reforms did not address the deficiencies 
of the role, and so were of little consequence to the overall impact of the 
inspectors on the ‘evils’ that were closely associated with colliery operations at 
the time.   
 
For example, the Committee focused on the appointment process, and 
suggested all future inspectors should have had at least seven years’ 
experience as a colliery manager before their appointment.235 It has already 
been discussed that all of the existing inspectors were familiar with the coal 
trade, and so this suggestion did not address the immediately relevant 
issues.236 It focused on the future rather than the present. The Committee also 
recommended increasing the inspectors’ salaries and prohibiting inspectors 
from carrying out any business other than their inspecting duties.237 Again, 
these suggestions were of no relevance to the deficiencies of the role; there 
was no correlation between an inspector’s salary, for example, and the number 
of deaths in their district. While these recommendations were undoubtedly 
sensible precautions to ensure that future inspectors were suitable for the role, 
the Committee largely overlooked the most obvious reforms that would have 
made a significant difference to the overall effectiveness of the inspectors at 
the time.   
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There was one recommendation made by the 1853-1854 Select Committee 
that attracted severe criticism. The Committee suggested that the Government 
should not have increased the powers of the inspectors.238 With the benefit of 
hindsight it is clear that this recommendation was not in the best interest of the 
colliers at the time. If the Committee had fully appreciated the cause of the 
Washington Colliery explosion in 1851, as well as considering the comments of 
Inspector Dunn and the jury at the inquest, then the benefits of increasing the 
inspectors’ powers should have been obvious. More dangers would have been 
identified, more effective remedies would have been insisted upon, and 
therefore more accidents would have been prevented. By increasing the 
powers of the inspectors, in line with the recommendations made by 
Tremenheere, Dunn and the various inquiries that had gone before, then it is 
likely that there would have been a noticeable improvement in colliery safety 
throughout the United Kingdom. As a result, such reforms would have 
increased the likelihood of the Government inspectors representing a panacea 
for the numerous ‘evils’ associated with colliery operations in the nineteenth 
century.  
 
The Manner of Our Legislation Is Indeed Detestable, and the Machinery 
for Settling That Manner Odious  
 
The report of the 1853-1854 Select Committee, though comprehensive, was 
unsatisfactory in relation to Government inspection of mines and collieries. The 
inspectors were also of this opinion; in their 1854 report they highlighted their 
own suggestions for reform, which were far more extensive than those 
proposed by the Select Committee.239 Dunn in particular was vocal on the 
issue. To begin with, Dunn gave a detailed account of how accidents of all kinds 
might have been prevented at collieries, both above and below ground.240 It 
was his opinion that the majority of accidents were the result of fatal oversights 
by those in charge of the colliery, many of which would have been prevented if 
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the individual in question had been aware of the danger in the first place.241 
Dunn then went on to highlight the correct way in which to light a colliery through 
the use of safety lamps, and then gave extensive recommendations as to how 
a colliery should be organised in order to ensure maximum safety.242  
 
By including this information in his report, Dunn was able to exploit a loophole 
in the limitations placed on his role. Rather than giving unsolicited advice during 
his visits to the collieries, he was making general observations relating to 
examples of good practice. In spite of this, he acknowledged that the relevant 
literature regarding colliery safety, such as the Select Committee reports and 
the reports of the inspectors, were not widely accessed by the colliery 
managers. 243  As a result, the content of his reports would not have been 
commonly available, and so would not have been implemented in enough 
collieries in order to make a noticeable improvement to colliery safety. Once 
again, this is a key criticism of the inspectors’ limited powers and the 1853-1854 
Select Committee’s recommendation not to increase them. If Dunn had been 
given more extensive powers of intervention in collieries, then it is likely that he 
would have been able to ensure that colliery owners and managers understood 
his advice. As a result, colliery safety would have been improved, and so many 
of the basic ‘evils’ that were inherent in the trade would have been addressed. 
This would have given the inspectors the opportunity to evolve into the panacea 
for the numerous ‘evils’ that were associated with coal mining in the nineteenth 
century.  
 
The 1854 report of the Government inspectors was critical of the Coal Mines 
Inspection Act 1850, the recommendations of the 1852 and 1853-1854 Select 
Committees, and the limitations of their role. The advice given by Dunn 
represented a set of guidelines, which should have been enforceable by each 
of the inspectors at the collieries under their control. The Government 
responded to these criticisms by proposing reforms to the role, achieved 
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through the introduction of a Bill in Parliament.244 Unlike the previous Bills, 
which had reluctantly created and then limited the role of the inspectors, this 
Bill identified and addressed a number of the deficiencies present in the Coal 
Mines Inspection Act 1850. Mirroring the proposals made by Dunn in his 1854 
report, the Bill included a set of rules to be enforced at each colliery.245 The Bill 
also instructed the colliery owners to formulate a set of special rules, which 
would apply to their own collieries, taking into account the unique nature of each 
mine.246 The special rules were to be subject to approval by the inspectors, who 
could refer the rule to an independent mining expert if the colliery owner did not 
agree with it. This represented an extensive increase in power for the 
inspectors; they would no longer be restricted in giving advice and they would 
have a central role in advising how each colliery should operate. As a result of 
the Bill, the inspectors would have, once again, had the potential to be the 
panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ that attended colliery operations in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
During a Bill’s progression through Parliament, the committee stage, where 
each clause of the Bill is considered in greater detail, is now regarded as being 
ritualistic and uneventful.247 In the nineteenth century, however, this was not 
always the case, especially in relation to colliery legislation. It has already been 
seen that the Mines and Collieries Bill 1842 and the Coal Mines Inspection Bill 
1850 were subjected to extensive amendments at committee stage before 
becoming law, and the 1855 Bill was no different. Although minor changes were 
made to the set of rules to be observed by every colliery, these changes were 
insignificant and did still reflect the list drafted by Dunn in 1854.248 Likewise, the 
colliery owners were still compelled to create a set of special rules relevant to 
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their collieries.249 The most significant change, however, was that these rules 
did not have to be approved by the inspector, nor could the inspector refer the 
rules to an independent mining expert. This power was now given to the 
Secretary of State.250 Such an amendment can be criticised on the basis that, 
once again, it limited the function of the inspectorate. The inspectors, who were 
all experts in coal mining, would have been able to identify when a special rule 
should have been created, leading to safer colliery operations overall. As a 
result, ‘evils’ would have been identified and addressed, thus giving the 
inspectors the opportunity to evolve into the much called for panacea during 
the nineteenth century.  
 
The Bill was also amended in the House of Lords, though the changes were 
minor. It came into force as the Coal Mines Act 1855, repealing and replacing 
the Coal Mines Inspection Act 1850.251 Boyd suggested that the 1855 Act was 
a dramatic improvement on the 1850 Act, and that the legislative protections 
should be regarded as ‘a master’s measure’.252 It is true that the Act introduced 
stronger protections for the colliers: every colliery had to adhere to a set of 
general rules; each colliery was subject to unique special rules; and all of the 
colliers had to be educated on the content of the rules.253 However, I would 
disagree with Boyd’s suggestion that the Act represented a ‘master’s measure’. 
The 1855 Act did not equip the inspectors with strong enough powers. For 
example: the inspectors were unable to make suggestions in order to improve 
the safety of a colliery; they were unable to create and enforce special rules; 
and they could not halt the working at a colliery if a danger was discovered. As 
a result, the only significant development in the inspectors’ role was that they 
could inform the colliers of the danger they were exposed to. By giving colliers 
notice of the danger, the colliers could legitimately refuse to resume work until 
the danger had been remedied. This was not, however, a substantial power; 
the colliers could still choose to resume work, and so were still subjected to the 
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danger identified. As a result, the inspectors in 1855 were not in a substantially 
stronger position than they had been when operating under the 1850 Act, and 
were no closer to being regarded as a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ that 
attended colliery operations at the time.   
 
Let’s Make It Simple: Government Control Means Uniformity, Regulation, 
Fees, Inspection, and Yes, Compliance  
 
When evaluating the inspectors’ reports after the introduction of the Coal Mines 
Act 1855, it is demonstrable that colliery safety did not dramatically improve. It 
would be naïve to suggest that there should have been an immediately 
noticeable improvement; a slight delay would have been expected while the 
collieries adjusted to the development in the law. However, it would have been 
reasonable to expect to have seen an improvement after, perhaps, five years. 
This was not the case. Despite the Act, colliery accidents and colliery related 
deaths continued to occur on a frequent basis. This was the case throughout 
the United Kingdom, not just in the collieries under Dunn’s supervision. It is 
therefore apparent that the inspectors, although increased in number, did not 
advance into a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ associated with colliery 
operations after the introduction of the Coal Mines Act 1855.254 
 
In 1860, five years after the 1855 Act, a subterranean explosion at Burradon 
Colliery, located in what was then Northumberland but is now Tyne and Wear, 
killed seventy-six colliers.255 The disaster was significant for two reasons. It 
highlighted the inadequacy of the relief systems in place for the dependants of 
colliers who were killed during their employment. 256  Secondly, and more 
importantly, it demonstrated that the Government inspectors of mines and 
collieries did not have adequate powers under the 1855 Act. Two years 
previously, in 1858, the colliers had repeatedly raised concerns regarding the 
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ventilation of the mine with the colliery management.257 The manager had failed 
to take any action, and so the colliers had contacted Dunn anonymously and 
asked him to visit the colliery.258 Dunn complied with this request, examined the 
colliery, and made several recommendations for improving the ventilation in the 
mine.259 However, it should be remembered that Dunn did not have the power 
to enforce his recommendations and, as a result, the colliery did not implement 
them all. Over the course of the next two years the colliery altered and 
expanded but did not improve the ventilation.260 As a result, Dunn concluded 
that the 1860 explosion was the direct result of inadequate ventilation in the 
mine.261 
 
The explosion at Burradon Colliery highlighted the shortfalls of the inspectorate 
in several ways. For example, one of the main responsibilities of the inspectors 
was to ensure that colliers were not exposed to danger while working in a mine. 
Despite this, the ventilation of Burradon Colliery was considered dangerous for 
many months in 1858 and again in 1860. The issue of ventilation was one of 
the many ‘evils’ associated with coal mining at the time, and it is clear that the 
inspectors were unable to remedy this, even after their powers had been 
increased under the 1855 Act. Reflecting on the explosion, Dunn conceded that 
his role was flawed. To begin with, he lamented the fact that the inspectors 
worked in isolation, without the help of an assistant or office.262 The inspectors 
were frequently overworked and could not spend a suitable amount of time 
inspecting each of the collieries under their control. The inspectors had to rely 
on the information given to them by the colliery owners and managers, which 
often had to be taken at face value, even if this was not an accurate reflection 
of the colliery.263 This was undoubtedly a major issue; the inspectors did not 
have the ability to identify all of the ‘evils’ present in a particular colliery, such 
as at Burradon, and so could not ensure that they were remedied. It cannot, 
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therefore, be suggested that the inspectors operating under the 1855 Act were 
a panacea for the ‘evils’ associated with nineteenth century coal mining.  
 
In his account of the explosion, Dunn was also critical of the limited powers that 
the inspectors had. He considered it regrettable that the he, along with the other 
inspectors, was unable to intervene in the management of a colliery, especially 
where such an intervention would result in greater safety.264 As an inspector 
could only make recommendations, which were unenforceable, colliery owners 
and managers frequently ignored the advice given to them and were often 
unwilling to engage with the inspectors.265 Once again this meant that the 
inspectors, while having the potential to make a difference to colliery safety, 
were unable to be a panacea for the ‘evils’ commonly encountered in the trade. 
Their powers of intervention and enforcement were not strong enough under 
the 1855 Act to have a noticeable impact at the time.  
 
The Burradon Colliery explosion should have highlighted the inadequacies in 
the law. Together with Dunn’s report, it should have been clear that the 
Government inspectors were vital to colliery safety but did not have the 
necessary powers. The 1855 Act continued to operate unaltered, and the 
powers of the inspectors were not increased. In 1862, just two years after the 
explosion at Burradon, there was yet another major colliery disaster. This 
disaster occurred at the New Hartley Colliery, Seaton Deleval, Northumberland, 
killing two hundred and four colliers, making it one of England’s worst mining 
disasters.266 New Hartley Colliery was prone to underground flooding, being 
located in close proximity to the coast, and a forty-two-ton beam engine, the 
largest in England, had been installed in order to drain the water.267  During a 
shift change the cast iron beam, which was positioned directly above the 
mineshaft, fractured and collapsed. The beam fell down the mineshaft, 
destroying the supports that had been attached to the walls, effectively sealing 
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the mine and trapping the colliers underground.268 As the ventilation system 
had also been destroyed the colliers eventually suffocated. There were no 
survivors.  
 
Following the New Hartley Disaster, public attention was drawn to the dangers 
of a mine having only one shaft.269 If the mine at New Hartley had had a second 
shaft, then the colliers would have been able to use it to escape and the majority 
of the deaths would have been prevented.270 The single shaft issue was not 
new; it had been a controversial practice for many years. Professor Ansted had 
highlighted the dangers of the single shaft system in 1845;271 John Kenyon 
Blackwell, who was appointed as one of the first four Government inspectors in 
1851, reported on the dangers of a single shaft in 1850;272 and the colliers of 
Durham and Northumberland had directed Parliament’s attention to the issue 
in 1852.273 In spite of the obvious dangers relating to the single shaft system, 
Parliament had never issued any guidance on the matter, and so it continued 
unchallenged.  
 
Following the New Hartley Disaster, Dunn was criticised by the colliers in his 
district. They suggested that Dunn had shown cowardice in failing to speak out 
against the single shaft practice prior to the accident.274 This criticism was not 
justified. It has already been seen that the 1855 Act did not give the inspectors 
any power of intervention or enforcement. Dunn could only recommend that 
collieries operated with multiple shafts but could not compel them to do so. 
There was no law against a colliery having a single shaft, and so Dunn was not 
able to ask the Secretary of State to intervene. Clearly, the deaths caused by 
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the New Hartley Disaster would have been avoided if there had been a second 
shaft, but criticising the inspector for this was not fair. While the Government 
inspectors may have been aware of the danger, Parliament was equally well 
informed. The New Hartley Disaster emphasised the fact that the inspectors 
operating under the 1855 Act were not a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ 
associated with colliery operations at the time. If they had of been a panacea, 







During the nineteenth century there were a multitude of ‘evils’ associated with 
colliery operations. These ‘evils’ were varied and included, for example, poor 
ventilation of mines, frequent underground explosions, and the limited 
knowledge that the colliers had of safety practices. When the concept of a 
Government inspector of mines and collieries was first proposed, the role had 
the potential to be a panacea for these ‘evils’. The aim was to appoint men who 
could visit collieries, promote safe mining practices, and who could share their 
knowledge with the colliery managers and owners. Despite the potential, the 
Government inspectors who operated in the industry between 1842 and 1862 
did not represent this panacea for a number of reasons. 
 
To begin with, the first office of Government inspector, created under the Mines 
and Collieries Act 1842, was far too restricted. During the passage of the Act 
through Parliament, many of the colliery owning Members succeeded in limiting 
the role of the inspector. As a result, the only inspector who had been 
appointed, Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, focused on the social conditions of 
the mining population, rather than on the colliery operations themselves. This 
distinction meant that the scope of Tremenheere’s investigations was extremely 
narrow, with many of the ‘evils’ associated with colliery operations falling 
outside of his purview. A panacea can be defined as ‘something that will solve 
all problems’, and yet Tremenheere allowed a number of ‘evils’ to be 
perpetuated in the collieries.275 While he was aware of collieries that continued 
to employ women and children under the age of ten underground, he did not 
take any action, primarily because he did not have suitable powers of 
intervention and enforcement. This was one of the issues that he had been 
appointed to address, and, as a result, he cannot be regarded as having solved 
all of the ‘evils’ that were present in the collieries.  
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When considering the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 in greater depth, however, 
Tremenheere cannot be criticised for his failure to amount to a panacea. While 
it is true that a Government inspector may have had the potential to amount to 
a panacea for these ‘evils’, Tremenheere did not satisfy this potential because 
the Act he was appointed under did not allow him to do so. The limited focus of 
the Act, and the Members of Parliament responsible for this, should be criticised 
rather than Tremenheere. If Tremenheere’s focus had been on the mines and 
collieries, and not the social conditions of the colliers, then it is more likely that 
he could have amounted to a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ that were 
present at the time.  
 
The inspectors appointed under the Coal Mines Inspection Act 1850 also had 
the potential to be a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ associated with 
nineteenth century colliery operations. Indeed, they had a much clearer focus; 
unlike Tremenheere, they were appointed to inspect the condition of the mines 
and collieries, rather than the colliers. This focus, together with their mining 
experiences, meant that they were perfectly placed to address the many ‘evils’ 
in existence. The 1850 Act also failed to equip the inspectors with the necessary 
powers of intervention and enforcement that would have allowed them to 
directly address the ‘evils’ that they uncovered. As a result, the inspectors were 
unable to improve the overall safety of the collieries, highlighted by the continual 
occurrence of colliery accidents and colliery related deaths. While the 
inspectors appointed under the 1850 Act were in a stronger position than the 
inspector who had been appointed under the 1842 Act, they were still unable 
to remedy all of the ‘evils’ associated with colliery operations at the time. This 
means that the inspectors operating under the 1850 Act cannot be considered 
as a panacea either.  
 
When the 1850 Act was repealed and replaced with the Coal Mines Act 1855, 
it should have been clear that the inspectors had been unable to amount to a 
panacea for the many ‘evils’ of the mining industry since their introduction in 
1842. As a result, it might have been expected that the role would have been 
extensively reformed in order to give the inspectors the wider powers that they 
required. Unfortunately, this was not the case. While the role was, indeed, 
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reformed, the changes were minor. This meant that the inspectors who were 
operating under the 1855 Act were also limited in their ability to address the 
many ‘evils’ associated with nineteenth century colliery operations. Colliery 
accidents and colliery related deaths continued to occur on a frequent basis, 
such as the Burradon Colliery explosion and the New Hartley Disaster, and so 
the inspectors operating under the 1855 Act had clearly been unable to address 
the relevant ‘evils’. Once again, the 1855 Act had been too reserved, resulting 
in yet another form of inspector who could not amount to a panacea for the 
numerous ‘evils’ associated with colliery operations in the nineteenth century.   
 
While it is true that the various inspectors who were operating between 1842 
and 1862 made their own contributions to colliery safety, it would not be correct 
to define them as a panacea for the numerous ‘evils’ that attended colliery 
operations at the time. Colliery accidents and colliery related deaths continued 
to occur, and so the introduction of the inspectors did not solve all the relevant 
problems.276 Neither would it be correct to criticise them for this. The inspectors 
had the potential to amount to a panacea for the ‘evils’ identified, but they would 
have required much more extensive powers of inspection, intervention and 
enforcement. The Acts of Parliament introduced in 1842, 1850 and 1855 were 
too reserved and they did not provide adequate powers for the inspectors. As 
a result, the Government inspectors were vital in identifying the many ‘evils’ 
associated with colliery operations in the nineteenth century, but were unable 













The image below was created to show the approximate location of the collieries 
that have existed in the North East of England. Its scope is not, however, 
confined to the nineteenth century; it includes the locations of all collieries that 
are known to have been operational in the area. The map shows just one 
portion of the area that Inspector Matthias Dunn was responsible for inspecting.   
 
‘Coal Mines – England’ (Northern Mine Research Society) <https://www.nmrs.org.uk/mines-
map/coal-mining-in-the-british-isles/collieries-of-the-british-isles/coal-mines-england/> 




The image below is a portrait of Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, the first 





































‘Portrait of Hugh Seymour Tremenheere’ (Artnet) <http://www.artnet.com/artists/george-
richmond/portrait-of-hugh-seymour-tremenheere-66dR7C5sPeSkgS8HW1jWIA2> accessed 












The image below shows the death mask of Matthias Dunn. Dunn was appointed 
as one of the first Government Inspectors of mines and collieries under the Coal 





































‘The Masks’ (The Rise and Fall of Phrenology in Edinburgh) 




















From the very beginning I knew that coal mining could prove to be a 
controversial area to write about. Reflecting on the 1984-1985 miners’ strike, 
Margaret Thatcher stated that the historical development of the coal industry 
had made it ‘an industry where reason simply did not apply’, going on to suggest 
that any discussion of the area would inevitably be political. My first instinct was 
to avoid any political discussion, though I soon realised that this would be 
impossible and, potentially, unwise. The laissez-faire doctrine, a political as well 
as economic principle, has featured in my introduction, and I have also included 
the work of Friedrich Engels, the German communist. 
 
Another author suggested that coal mining is never a good area to write about, 
as it is usually only ever approached by people who are colliers themselves, 
who are related to colliers, or who live in mining communities. For this reason, 
it has been suggested that their judgement will always be clouded by emotion, 
reducing the overall value of their work. I have already highlighted my 
associations with a mining community, and must also acknowledge being 
related to colliers across the country, including at the New Hartley Colliery. In 
spite of this, I believe I have been able to approach this project in an objective 
and fair way, without my judgement being influenced by strong emotion. I 
would, therefore, disagree with that particular author’s assessment.   
 
I noted my enthusiasm and excitement about this project in my preface, and I 
can genuinely say that these feelings have stayed with me throughout my 
research. This project has not felt like traditional work, where it can be difficult 
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to focus and requires a certain amount of will power to complete. Without a 
doubt, it has been the most enjoyable piece of work that I have ever completed. 
Combined with the archive sessions and the presentations at the Christmas 
conference, it has been a remarkable experience. There have, of course, been 
a number of challenges along the way, some of which have been easier to 
overcome than others.  
 
The first challenge was locating and accessing relevant sources. Due to the 
age of the sources they were frequently difficult to access in an online format, 
and so I was regularly searching for the same source in a number of different 
websites and databases. For example, it was surprisingly difficult to access 
some of the legislation from the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth century; while it was possible to find the title, the full text was often 
elusive. There were some sources that were available online, but were of such 
poor quality that it was impossible to read them, or which had pages missing 
and torn. Likewise, some of the sources had obscure names or had been 
uploaded with misspelled words in the title. While frustrating at the time, this did 
have its advantages; it made me open and read through sources which I didn’t 
necessarily consider important, some of which I did go on to use in my work.      
 
In my project I have highlighted the fact that there were two offices of 
Government inspector that operated simultaneously. One held by Tremenheere 
and the other held by Dunn and his colleagues. This was something that I did 
not initially realise; when reading the sources it is not immediately clear that 
there were two different inspecting roles. Sources frequently refer to ‘the 
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inspector’, without naming which inspector it is referencing. In fact, I am not 
even sure that the existence of the two offices is widely known; many authors 
appear to assume that all of the Government inspectors had the same 
responsibility. As I have shown, this was not the case. Inevitably this led to 
some confusion early on in the project, requiring a significant amount of time to 
work out, exactly, which individual the source relates to. In my project I did focus 
on Tremenheere and Dunn, but it should be noted that the other inspectors all 
appear to be interesting characters in their own right. They do not appear to be 
well researched and it would be a shame for their contributions to colliery safety 
to go unrecognised.  
 
Before I started writing I did create an essay plan, setting out what I would cover 
in each chapter. As I began writing, however, this plan was forced to evolve. I 
have written a significant amount on the build up to the Mines and Collieries 
Act 1842, something I had not originally intended to do, but which I believe is 
necessary to fully understand why the legislation was introduced. Similarly, I 
have discussed the passage of the Acts through Parliament in more detail than 
I had planned, although I also believe that this was necessary. As a result, there 
were parts of my original plan that I was unable to include in the final version of 
the project. I would have liked, for example, to compare the mines inspectors 
to the factory inspectors who were operating at the same time; the factory 
inspectors had much wider powers and were, therefore, in a much better 
position to make a tangible difference to the factory employees. The work of 
Matthias Dunn is also an area that I would have like to have expanded upon, 
as he was the most vocal inspector in relation to improving colliery safety. 
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Inquiries into the development of the inspectors’ role after 1862 would have 
been equally fascinating. Perhaps these themes will form the basis of further 
work in the future.  
 
The most significant challenge has undoubtedly been completing this project 
during the COVID-19 Pandemic. There were items in the Tyne and Wear 
Archive that I would have liked to have accessed again before completing my 
work, and others which I didn’t get the chance of requesting. There were books 
in the Lit & Phil that I had found at the beginning of my project, which I had 
planned on returning to towards the end of my project. There were books in the 
university library that were not available online. It would have been nice to 
access all of these materials as I was concluding this project, though I can’t 
help but feel relieved that I didn’t. It is more than likely that I would have found 
more areas to write about, and so would have been forced to dilute the work 
that I had already completed. If I ever expand on this work in the future, then I 
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